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Introduction
There is currently considerable discussion in UK politics -and emerging from the UK Government -about evidence-based policy. There are real hopes that trials and data analysis could enable a more scientific, open and evidence-based approach to policy (Cabinet Office 2012b; Haynes et al. 2012 ) along with arguments that evidence-based policy requires a move beyond relying primarily on Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) (Cartright and Hardie 2012) . Data analytics are hoped to offer a better and more 'objective' picture of policies' effects on citizens, transactions and behaviour, while trials are hoped to offer a more effective way of testing and adapting policies (Amoore and de Goede 2008; Hall and Mendel 2012; Haynes et al. 2012 ). However, this paper will challenge a tendency to simply state that a trial took place and present the results as strong evidence that a real effect was found, which is then viewed as good evidence to base policy upon. Instead, it is important for the details of research design, methodology and analysis to be exposed to public scrutiny so that the quality of the work can be assessed. It is also important to consider the risk of false discoveries in all trials, even impeccably well-designed and conducted projects. This paper draws on examples of two unpublished policy trials in order to illustrate this.
Evidence-based work has long been presented as an alternative to authority-, ideology-or faith-based approaches (for example Gambrill 1999; Marx and Hopper 2005) .
i Advocates of Evidence-Based Medicine have made strong claims about what constitutes good evidence which have implications well beyond the medical field: as Worral (2007) argues, "[r]eal evidence-based medicine results from applying the universal general principles of the logic of evidence to the particular case of medicine". In the context of policing, Sherman (2013: 1) argues that "[i]n contrast to basing decisions on theory, assumptions, tradition, or convention, an evidence-based approach continuously tests hypotheses with empirical research findings". This approach is associated with a move away from authority-based policies which are justified by reference to the expertise or other characteristics of those making recommendations: for example, Davies et al.'s (2000: 3) definition of evidence in the context of evidence-based policy "largely excludes evidence presented in forms such as expert judgement".
ii For Gerber and Green (2012: 8) experiments are fair in part insofar as they "involve transparent, reproducible procedures": ideas of openness are a key aspect of work around evidence, trials and policy.
RCTs are often presented as the primary or best a way of doing evidence-based policy: for example, Torgerson and Torgerson (2008: 1) broadly. This paper, though, will draw on work around evidence-informed policy and evidence-based medicine to consider a preceding question: how reliably some policy trials establish that a certain policy even works 'there'. The paper will use its two cases to argue that trials without adequate, timely publication and scrutiny leave one relying on the authority or eminence of those involved in running the trials; such trials might, at best, allow a form of authority-based rather than evidence-based policy. More recently, Colquhoun (2014) demonstrates that -where p=0.05 is taken as the threshold for statistical significance -one would expect significantly more than 5% of positive statistically significant trial findings to be false discoveries. While welldesigned research might reduce this risk of false discoveries, it will not be eliminated.
Statistically significant results from well-designed trials therefore still include a risk of false discoveries, and this can be much higher for smaller and/or lower-quality trials.
However, as discussed below, policy trials may be accepted as robust evidence with minimal public scrutiny and no significant discussion of questions around the risk of false discoveries. iii In medicine, there are criticisms of a tendency to adopt a "fetishisation of randomisation as scientific method rather than statistical technique" (May et al. 2005 ). In the case of some policy trials, the fact a (perhaps problematically) randomised trial has taken place can take priority over broader methodological and statistical issues. If what is presented as evidence-based policy is based on false discoveries from inadequately-scrutinised trials then this is a long way from the intentions of those advocating evidence-based or evidence-informed approaches.
Case studies
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This paper springs from previous research failures: I was unable to access details of how trials were used in two UK pieces of policy research. iv These two cases are unlikely to be representative of UK policy trials more broadly. However, focussing on two problematic but relatively high-impact cases is sufficient for the paper to demonstrate that particular risks can be associated with such trials.
This article will consider Behavioural Insights Team research where, despite large reported effects, there was not a timely publication of the detail of the research's methodology and analysis; it therefore could not be publicly assessed when results were announced (see Cabinet Office 2012a). The article will also discuss a Her
Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) trial on using credit referencing data to challenge fraud and error in the tax credit system (see Ross 2011) . In the case of this trial, the information which has been released raises serious questions about the quality of this research. In both cases, the Government's refusal to share information about the trials' methodology and analysis in a timely way made it impossible for external scholars to critically assess or replicate the studies, and therefore to confirm or refute their validity. v While I attempted to make this information public via
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, this was unsuccessful. The known flaws of the HMRC trial and opacity of both cases raise questions about government trials and, more generally, about evidence-based policy initiatives and the scientific-sounding claims on which they rely.
Behavioural Insights Team: increasing tax repayments
The Behavioural Insights Team, previously part of the Cabinet Office, has worked on how RCTs might guide public policy. vi When researching how to get people to pay tax more promptly they reported finding ways to increase tax repayments by 15% found, without publishing the information needed to critically assess these claims in a timely fashion. This is despite a Behavioural Insights Team publication arguing that publishing trial protocols before the trials start, "so that people can offer criticisms or improvements before the trial is running", is desirable (Haynes et al. 2012: 31) . In this instance, though, the policy of methodology being available in advance was not achieved in practice (though the Behavioural Insights Team are preparing to publish full methods in journal articles viii ) (Hallsworth 2016) . ix The fact delays in journal publication are (as Hallsworth (2016) notes) common and can be rather long means that, particularly once results have been publicised, it is problematic to withhold information based on such planned publications.
When the opportunity for timely public review and replication of work is removed without good reason, due to delayed publication, it is not appropriate to class policy based on this work as evidence-based.
x While there is internal scrutiny of government research, publication allows important additional scrutiny and input (see Haynes et al. 2012: 31) . Without publication, the RCT evidence in question only has value insofar as one trusts the researchers and internal scrutiny processes involved, based on little information about how the research has been conducted. However skilled the researchers and internal reviewers are, no research is perfect and even the best researchers make mistakes. We are therefore left with something much closer to an old-fashioned reliance on expertise or eminence: one relies on the authority of the researchers and others involved in the project. It would therefore be better to call policy based on such work authority-based (due to this reliance on authority) rather than evidence-based.
HMRC: credit referencing data, tax credits, fraud and error
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HMRC has sought to draw on Experian credit referencing data in order to deal withand reduce losses from -fraudulent and erroneous claims for tax credits. A FOI response from HMRC states that they began their trial with a sample of 20,000 cases "identified using internal HMRC 'risk rules' that suggested there may be another adult living at the same address as the claimant." Subsequently, a group of "600…cases [that] were taken from those graded as 'high risk'…and 150 from those graded as 'medium risk'" was selected. The use of credit referencing data was trialled on this group.
This use of credit referencing data was supported in a Telegraph article by the argument that "figures showed that £5.2 billion was lost to fraudulent benefit claims and administrative errors…A trial has already saved £16 million after payments often exceeding £40,000 were stopped" (Ross 2011) . Government agencies thus hope that This trial has not been published so FOI requests were used to try to access information regarding this trial. I had limited success, and the information which has been made available raises serious questions about the trial's quality.
Withheld information
The public reporting of this trial -in a fairly brief Telegraph article -offers little detail: the article simply stated that a "trial has already saved £16 million after payments often exceeding £40,000 were stopped. Claimants were found to have been wrongly registering as single while living with partners who had jobs or other income" (Ross 2011) . It seems the Telegraph was (unsurprisingly) not seeking to 8 provide a CONSORT compliant article and its reporting does not meet CONSORT standards: for example, not adequately disclosing any pre-specified outcomes, statistical methods, summary results for each outcome, interpretation, etc.
The methodology used in this trial and the details of data analysis are not available for public scrutiny. HMRC responded to an FOI request for this by withholding this information, saying that "we believe that the requested information could be used by opportunistic individuals to make claims to which they are not entitled." However, it is hard to see how details of some fairly conventional aspects of a research project (for example, any statistical significance tests which have been conducted) could plausibly have assisted inappropriate tax credit claims. Given this nondisclosure, it appears that what Roberts (2006: 49) describes as a "bureaucratic interest in keeping secrets…deeply entrenched in bureaucratic routine" is active here.
Problematic reporting and methodology
As Gerber and Green (2012: 37) argue, if we cannot be certain that allocation procedures were robust there is a risk of selection bias; it is not clear if or how this was mitigated here. Different FOI responses from HMRC discuss a 'low risk' group, a 'medium risk' group and a 'low/medium risk' group as if the three terms refer to the same group (HMRC later stated that the 'low risk' group actually included households rated as both 'low' and 'medium' risk). HMRC did not detail how risk groups were defined or selected, and use the term 'Control Group' in the way that researchers would usually use the term 'Intervention Group'.
HMRC stated that this trial was "assessing the merits of using Credit Reference
Agencies [and] we set up the control group of 750 suspicious cases to contrast the difference between the results achieved by Credit Reference Agency (CRA) data match exercises using a revised process against Business as Usual (BAU) Undeclared Partner (UP) processes." Table 1 was offered in response to an FOI request as
showing "some of the key highlights". Table 1 here 9 HMRC chose to select a proportion of different risk groups for the trial: stating that "samples of 150 low/medium risk and 600 high risk cases were selected from the highest award value cases…Whether the sample of high-risk cases is representative of the UK population is moot, it was representative of HMRC's focus when we scaled up the activity". It is plausible that this approach would allow predictions of the future efficacy of using credit referencing data but this depends, for example, on whether the cases in the 'control group' are likely to be similar to future cases where credit referencing data are used.
The results in Table 1 are striking: it seems that these newer processes have very substantial effects and/or the Business As Usual and Credit Reference Information groups are rather different.
xi Without knowing about details of randomisation/selection, though, it is impossible to judge which of these is more likely. While Torgerson and Torgerson (2008: 43) argue that "[r]andomisation gives us the best method of ensuring that the variance that we do not know about or cannot measure will be balanced between the groups", one cannot tell whether randomisation was used to achieve this with this trial: the trial's results may just show differences between the groups of people in the trial.
If one bases policy on this work one is therefore left, at best, with authority-based policy: it is only due to trust in the authority of those doing the work, and HMRC's internal scrutiny processes, that this might be viewed as an adequate evidence base for policy. However, given the concerns raised above about this HMRC work, it is hard to have confidence in the quality of the aspects of this work which have not been made public and one might therefore question this authority.
Conclusions
This paper has outlined two cases where claims around data analysis and trials have served to make Government policy appear more scientific or evidence-based. This strategy was relatively successful: HMRC's analysis and use of credit referencing data was presented as a success based in part on reported trial results and, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first published attempt at a more critical assessment of the quality of this work. xii The Behavioural Insights Team's work has also attracted considerable positive publicity.
This paper has raised questions about the lack of timely published information about some of the Behavioural Insights Team's work and about problems with and the lack of published information about an HMRC trial. Without the timely public reporting of more detail about the work which has been done, a reliance on the Behavioural Insights Team work discussed above was to a significant extent a reliance on the team's authority. The HMRC trial discussed above is, as shown by what has been released, problematic in a number of ways: the methodology and analysis are not available for public scrutiny, and the information which has been released should leave raise concerns. Clearly, the initial reporting of these trials falls far short of expectations of good practice as outlined, for example, in CONSORT guidelines.
An increased focus on evidence use in policy is welcome, and will hopefully lead to better use of relevant evidence. However, without the opportunity for more detailed analysis of and engagement with government trials, policy based on such trials should not generally be called evidence-based. In many cases, well-designed trials will provide very useful evidence. However, simply reporting that 'trials show' is of limited value without publication and critical assessment of these trials and other relevant evidence. As noted above, even with well-designed trials there is a real risk that positive findings might be a false discovery. In the cases discussed above it was not possible to conclude, based on what was published when trial findings were publicised, that these findings accurately reflect what happened there. Instead, one was -at best -relying on the authority of experts: relying on their reported findings based on a trust in their work rather than a robust assessment of this work and evidence. One might, if confident in the authority of these experts, be left at best with a relatively conventional type of authority-based policy. Policy based simply on an uncritical belief that trials show an intervention works or does not work -without adequate public assessment of or publication of these trials -should not be described as evidence-based.
Moreover, a reliance on poor quality unpublished policy trials may offer a particularly undesirable type of authority-based policy: where the trust is placed in the authority of numbers rather than the expertise of individuals. As Porter (1995) observes, it is tempting to place trust in numbers as if the very use or presence of these numbers indicates objectivity. Daston and Galison (1992: 122) argue that quantification is part of the "ethos of restraint" and "morality" associated with objectivity. As noted above, May et al. (2005) warn of a fetishisation of randomisation in research. Rather than being a foundation for evidence-based policy, or even providing any reliable expert authority, such a trust in the mere fact that a trial has taken place could be more analogous to the way that many gamblers develop 'systems' for counting the results in games of chance such as roulette in the belief that this increases the odds of winning: a trust in numbers and the quantifiable can persist even if there is no good reason to expect these numbers to help predict future events. In such cases, trust in numbers involves sacrificing the (admittedly limited) benefits of more conventional authority-based policy, which relies on human expertise; instead, policy is based upon the authority of numbers and quantification, even when these are unreliable. 
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